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I. INTRODUCTION
Only a very small minority of European firms is listed on a stock ex-
change. In Norway, for example, some 200-250 (231 on July 6th, 2006) of
the more than 100,000 limited liability firms are quoted on Oslo Stock Ex-
change. In spite of their overwhelming numerical majority, unlisted firms
receive little attention in empirical studies of financial structure. Since pub-
lication requirements for unlisted firms usually are minimal or absent, the
non-availability of data can partly explain this lack of attention. In Norway,
however, all limited liability firms are required by law to deposit their an-
nual financial statements in a central register, which is open to researchers.
Given the diversity within the business community and the variety of capital
structure theories, analyzing the way firms are financed can clearly benefit
from using a large database covering the entire population.
Using this unique database, this paper studies the financial structure of
non-listed firms. This can be an important addition to the literature, since
the empirical evidence on the determinants of financing decisions predomi-
nantly refers to the single, albeit large, environment of American listed firms.
Testing the empirical implications of capital structure theories on unlisted
firms that operate in a diﬀerent financial environment contributes to the em-
pirical evidence and may broaden insight into the capital structure choice.
Few studies of the capital structure of European companies have been pub-
lished (e.g. Carlsen and Nilsen, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic,1999;
Ozkan, 2002) and even fewer of non-listed companies (e.g. Scherr and Hul-
burt, 2001).
The scarcity of empirical evidence for non-listed firms is the motivation
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for this paper. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to supplement
the existing literature with an analysis of the factors determining the financial
structure of non-listed firms in Norway. This is done by empirically testing
theories of capital structure and debt maturity using panel data for non-
financial firms. A data set that includes all unlisted firms in Norway for
1995-2000 is used. Scherr and Hulburt (2001) who also analyzed unlisted
firms used a much smaller selection for 1987 and 1993 in the United States.
To our knowledge, the financing decisions for non-listed firms has not been
analyzed on such a large scale before.
The next section provides an explanation of the diﬀerent theories regard-
ing the financing of firms, as well as the results of some previous empirical
papers. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical proxies used in this
paper. Section 4 reports on the empirical analyses and the last section, 5,
concludes.
II. FINANCING DECISIONS AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Theories of capital structure and debt maturity
The origins of capital structure theory lie in the models of optimal capital
structure that were developed in the wake of the famous Modigliani-Miller
irrelevance theorem. These models later became know as the static trade-oﬀ
theory (see e.g. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), Baxter (1967), Gor-
don (1971), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976, 1977), Kim (1978),
Vinso (1979), and Scott (1981)). In this theory, the combination of leverage
related costs (associated with e.g. bankruptcy and agency relations) and a
tax advantage of debt produces an optimal capital structure at less than a
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100% debt financing, as the tax advantage is traded oﬀ against the likelihood
of incurring the costs. This theoretical result is now widely accepted in the
profession.
To a large extent, theories of debt maturity are based on the same mar-
ket imperfections that are modelled in theories of optimal capital structure.
Although the extension of capital structure models with diﬀerent debt cat-
egories seems obvious, the composition of corporate debt did not attract
much academic interest until the 1980’s. Since then, several diﬀerent theo-
ries of debt maturity choice have been formulated. These theories typically
model the eﬀect of the financial environment on debt maturity, whereby the
financial environment is expressed in cash flow characteristics and the above
mentioned market imperfections.
Brick and Ravid (1985) show that taxes can also imply an optimal debt
maturity structure. Depending on the term-structure of interest rates, long-
term (short-term) debt is optimal, since it accelerates the tax benefit of
debt given an increasing (decreasing) term structure. DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980) argue that the expected tax advantage of debt is decreased by depre-
ciation charges (and other non-debt tax shields) that are a substitute for the
tax benefits of interest payments. The combined implication for debt matu-
rity structure is that firms with large non-debt tax shields have an incentive
to take on more debt and lengthen the maturity of debt to make sure that the
remaining tax advantage is not less than the costs of issuing new short-term
debt.
When firms cannot reveal the true quality of their cash flows, i.e. when
information asymmetry exists, they can prevent or abate undervaluation by
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using a variety of signaling devices, such as debt (leverage), dividend pay-
ments or the maturity structure of debt. In the presence of information
asymmetry, firms have an incentive to signal their quality and credibility by
taking on more debt and shortening their debt maturity1. A higher lever-
age, especially more short-term debt, signals favorable inside information to
the market because it oﬀers the possibility to renegotiate terms in the fu-
ture, when more information has become available. Long-term debt entails
larger information costs than short-term debt, because the market expects
a higher deterioration of quality than insiders do. Firms with a low level
of information asymmetry are therefore more likely to issue long-term debt
(Flannery, 1986). Information asymmetry is higher for firms with large R&D
activities (Alam and Walton, 1995). In addition, a complex legal structure
(e.g. a holding company or large cross investments in daughter companies)
will make a firm less transparent and, thus, give rise to a higher level of
information asymmetry.
A rivaling capital structure theory is Myers’ pecking order theory. This
theory is based on information asymmetry which causes outside financing to
be more expensive than internal financing. This information asymmetry is
modelled by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). They argue that
asymmetric information lowers the price that investors are willing to pay for
issued shares. Therefore, firms prefer internal to external financing to fund
investments, and debt to equity if external financing is used. If no, or not
enough, retained earnings are available in the firm, debt will be issued. Debt
1This assumes that issuing costs are not too high and that the liquidity risk and the
interest rate uncertainty are taken into account.
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is less mispriced than equity, since it has a prior claim to equity. Issuing
new equity is the last choice of firms raising capital. In this pecking order
theory, as Myers calls it, observed debt ratios will reflect the cumulative
requirement for external financing which is inversely related to the cumulative
profitability (Myers, 1984). Short-term debt is less sensitive to mispricing
than long-term debt. Therefore short-term debt should be exhausted before
the firm issues long-term debt. It should be noted, however, that Jensen’s
(1986) free cash flow theory, which is based on conflicts of interest between
management and stockholders, predicts the opposite, i.e. a positive relation
between profitability and debt ratio. Free cash flow can be defined as cash
flow in excess of the funds required to finance positive net present value
projects. When profit levels are high, management may be enticed to use
the free cash flow on perquisites or negative net present value investments.
An increase in the level of debt forces the managers to pay out cash and thus
reduces the free cash flow.
Firms with risky debt and large future growth opportunities are espe-
cially prone to incur the agency costs that can arise from conflicts of interest
between diﬀerent stakeholders. In these firms, shareholders have an incentive
to choose investment strategies that are suboptimal for the firm as a whole.
These strategies, characterized as asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) and underinvestment (Myers, 1977), are beneficial to the shareholders
because they transfer wealth from the bondholders to the shareholders or
prevent a transfer in the opposite direction. Rational bondholders will antic-
ipate these strategies and protect themselves by adjusting their terms. The
resulting decrease in firm value is an agency cost of debt. More debt increases
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agency costs. Furthermore, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) showed that
issuing short-term debt mitigates these costs, since short-term debt reduces
managerial flexibility by oﬀering frequent renegotiation possibilities.
Myers (1977) reasons that by matching the maturities of debt and assets,
debt repayments are scheduled to correspond with the decline in value of
assets currently in place. This matching reduces the agency costs of debt.
Stohs andMauer (1996) contend that a debt maturity shorter than the asset’s
life will increase the risk of default, since not enough cash may be available
when the debt is due. When the maturity of debt is longer than the life of
the assets, the firm may encounter problems finding new assets to support
the debt. An extensive survey of the theories concerning capital structure
can be found in Harris and Raviv (1991), and for debt maturity structure
and their empirical tests in Ravid (1996).
Empirical studies
Few studies have analyzed the financing decisions of small, non-listed
firms. Scherr and Hulburt found strong support for the maturity matching
principle, weak support for the eﬀects of taxes and information asymmetry,
while they rejected the eﬀects of agency theory and size. To compare the
results of this study with the literature, which is dominated by listed firms
in large countries as the United States, we also provide an overview of those
empirical studies in Table 1. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and
Ozkan (2002) give results for non-American data, but also use listed firms.
As will be evident from Table 1, only the maturity matching principle
is supported in all studies. There is no univocal support for or rejection of
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any of the theories and the size eﬀect. Newberry and Novack (1999), which
specifically tests the tax theory, supports this theory. Otherwise, the tax
eﬀect is usually rejected or weakly supported for the capital structure and
debt maturity structure. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) found the pecking
order theory to provide an adequate description of the capital structure of
firms. However, Chirinko and Singha (2000) argue that there are serious
diﬃculties2 with Shyam-Sunder and Myers’ models. They conclude that
alternative tests are needed to identify the determinants of capital structure.
Ghosh and Cai (1999) find evidence for both the trade-oﬀ theory and the
pecking order theory and suggest both models can coexist. The empirical
support for agency eﬀects, asymmetric information/signaling eﬀects, and size
eﬀects is also mixed.
III. DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND PROXY VARIABLES
Data
The database contains standardized yearly accounting data of all Nor-
wegian limited liability firms throughout the period 1995-2000. The total
number of these firms increases from slightly over 100,000 in 1995 to around
130,000 in the year 2000. Including such a large number of firms directly in
the analysis is not a sound research design for at least two reasons. First,
since the database contains the entire population of firms, repeated use would
lead to data snooping. Second, any population of registered firms is likely
2The test used by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is based on the pecking order’s
prediction that a large variation in debt is explained by deficits. The test will reject
the pecking order hypothesis incorrectly when a firm has a financial structure consistent
with the pecking order theory, but uses mostly equity in external financing (Chirinko and
Singha, 2000).
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to contain some non-operative firms, which are established or maintained for
e.g. tax advantages only. We use two samples from the database for our
analysis and limit the analysis to the population of non-financial firms. Ob-
servations for financial firms, such as banks, are not used. First, a random
sample of 4,500 firms is extracted, around 5 percent of the total population.
To exclude non-operative companies, companies with total assets or total
sales less than 100,000 Norwegian kroner (approximately $15,000) are ex-
cluded from this sample. Furthermore, all firms with a negative book value
of equity are deleted. Small firms with negative equity are usually financed
by personal guarantees of their owner and the personal financing of firms is
not the subject of the theories investigated here. This reduces the sample to
2,875 non-financial unlisted companies for which a financial statement was
available for each year of the period, yielding a total number of observations3
of 14,375. To verify that this sample of 2,875 firms represents the entire
population, a second random sample is extracted with the same selection
process. This resulted in 2,787 firms, none of which are included in the first
sample. Some descriptive statistics of the samples are given in Table 2. As
can be seen from Table 2, both samples cover a wide range of firm sizes, from
total asset sizes just over 100,000 kroner to over 3 resp. 9 billion (109) kroner.
However, the averages of the two samples are quite close. The sectors defined
in the data sets can be found in Table 5 in the appendix.
Capital structure is measured as the ratio of debt to total assets. Since
3For both samples one year of observations is used to compute the growth of sales or the
change in earnings. Some extreme outliers (0.1 percent extremes of the observations) are
deleted from the dataset prior to estimation. This results in 14,357 firm-year observations
for the first random sample and 13,910 for the second sample.
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the database consists of accounting data, all values are book values. No di-
rect measure of debt maturity is available in the data, but the amounts of
long-term debt and short-term debt are registered. In Norwegian balance
sheets, the division between short-term and long-term debt is set at one year
maturity. Consequently, there are two alternative ways to analyze debt ma-
turity in these data. The first is to use some ratio of long-term to short-term
debt. The second is to estimate separate relations for long-term debt and
short-term debt. We use the second option. An advantage of this indirect
estimation method is that eﬀects on long-term and short-term debt will not
cancel out. This gives the opportunity to determine whether the factors that
influence short-term debt diﬀer from those that determine long-term debt.
Since an identical, linear specification is used for long and short term debt,
the eﬀects on total leverage are simply the sum of the eﬀects on both debt
categories. For convenience, a (superfluous) separate analysis of total debt
is also provided.
Proxy variables
The empirical model is constructed to reflect, as far as the data will allow,
the theoretical determinants of capital structure and debt maturity structure
discussed in section 2. The dependent variables in this study are the ratios
of short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt to total assets. We use a
measure for all variables that is unaﬀected by the level of trade credit, since
trade credit is likely to be jointly influenced by factors that are specific to
each industry (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Accounts payable and accounts
receivable are thus subtracted from debt and assets.
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Although the Norwegian tax system has been changed many times, it
still oﬀers the possibility to deduct interest payments from taxable income.
However, this incentive to prefer debt over equity has become smaller over
the years. According to Bøhren and Michalsen (2001, p. 261) the tax ad-
vantage of debt changed from 0.75 per Norwegian kroner in 1980 to 0.28 in
1993. Following this period the tax system remained stable until 2000, which
includes our observation period. To test the eﬀect of taxes on debt maturity
we use depreciation charges, the substitute variable suggested by DeAngelo
and Masulis (1980). The empirical proxy is the ratio of depreciation charges
to total costs, used earlier by Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993). As non-
debt tax shields give firms an incentive to take on more debt, as well as to
lengthen the maturity of debt, the hypothesis is a positive relation between
the depreciation charges and leverage and long-term debt, and a negative
relation with short-term debt.
In presence of information asymmetry, the change in earnings per share
can be regarded as a signal of the insiders’ expected change in firm quality
(Barclay and Smith, 1995, and Stohs and Mauer, 1996). Earnings per share
is, however, only available for listed firms. For the non-listed firms in this
paper, information asymmetry is proxied by the amount of cross-investments
in daughter companies relative to total assets. These investments make a
firm less transparent, which is hypothesized to be associated with less debt,
relatively high short-term debt, and relative less long-term debt.
Following Scherr and Hulburt (2001) growth of sales is used as a proxy
for agency problems of debt for the non-listed firms, since again the standard
proxy in the literature, book-to-market value, is not available. This implicitly
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assumes that past growth is an indicator for future growth. The empirical
implication is that more growth is associated with less leverage, more short-
term debt and less long-term debt.
Profitability is used as a proxy variable when testing the pecking order
theory (Wald, 1999). A negative relation is expected between profits (mea-
sured as return on assets) and all forms of leverage. Short-term debt is higher
on the pecking order as it is less sensitive to mispricing than long-term debt.
Therefore, its estimated coeﬃcient should be lower than the coeﬃcient of
long-term debt. Notice that, as profits are a prerequisite for firms to use the
tax shield of debt, the trade-oﬀ theory expects a positive relation between
profit and both short-term and long-term debt. Furthermore, Jensen’s (1986)
free cash flow theory also expects a positive relation between profit and debt,
as the latter is used as a disciplinary instrument at high free cash flow levels.
The maturity matching principle is empirically tested with the maturity
of assets, measured by the ratio of current to total assets (in book values).
The hypothesis is a positive relation between this ratio and short-term debt
and a negative relation with long-term debt.
In addition to the proxies reflecting the diﬀerent capital structure and
debt maturity theories, firm size is often included in empirical studies, as Ta-
ble 1 shows. Most studies argue for a positive relation between firm size and
debt maturity. The arguments used are that large firms have: (1) economies
of scale in issuing long-term debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995), (2) better ac-
cess to capital markets (Ozkan, 2002), (3) fewer growth opportunities (Kim,
Mauer and Stohs, 1995), (4) a higher credit quality (Guedes and Opler, 1996),
(5) more possibilities to publish information about themselves (Scherr and
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Hulburt, 2001), and, finally, (6) more collateral (Ozkan, 2002). We include
size as measured by the logarithm of the book value of total assets. Most of
these arguments also suggest a positive relation between size and total lever-
age. Combined this means that a positive eﬀect of firm size on long-term
debt is expected, and that this eﬀect outweighs the smaller or negative eﬀect
on short-term debt.
Finally, Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that firms within an industry are
more similar than those in diﬀerent industries are. An industry eﬀect will be
measured by industry (or sector) dummies. Adding dummies in the regres-
sion helps avoiding correlation among residuals. To avoid perfect correlation
with the dummies, the intercept is excluded from the regressions.
IV. RESULTS
The proxy variables discussed in the previous section are included in fixed-
eﬀects panel data regressions for both samples, with leverage, short-term
debt and long-term debt, in the given definitions, as dependent variables.
The resulting estimates for the 2,875 non-listed firms in the first sample and
the 2,878 non-listed firms in the second sample are presented in Tables 3 and
4, respectively.
Tables 3 and 4 show that the tax hypothesis is supported for all financing
decisions in the non-listed firms. All estimated coeﬃcients of the non-debt
tax shield have the hypothesized sign and are significantly diﬀerent from
zero. Leverage and debt maturity appears indeed to be positively related to
the size of non-debt tax shields. These findings are similar to Newberry and
Novack (1999) and in contrast with Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes
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and Opler (1996).
The hypothesized eﬀect of information asymmetry is not supported for
the capital structure, and only partly for the maturity structure. For the first
random sample, only the coeﬃcient of the proxy variable for long-term debt is
significantly diﬀerent from zero in the hypothesized (negative) direction. For
the second random sample the hypothesis is supported. The corresponding
coeﬃcient of short term debt is not significant, so the non-listed firms appear
indeed to shorten debt maturity to curtail information asymmetry problems,
but not to change the level of leverage. This evidence is consistent with Ozkan
(2002), who does not find support for an asymmetric information eﬀect for
listed firms in the UK. However, the evidence conflicts with Barclay and
Smith’s (1995) finding of a significantly negative relationship between debt
maturity and change in earnings for firms in the US.
The hypothesized eﬀect of agency costs for all financing decisions is ei-
ther significant with the incorrect sign or not significant. The agency cost
hypothesis is thus rejected. These results are consistent with the findings of
Scherr and Hulburt (2001), who rejects the agency eﬀect for small, mostly
unlisted, firms in the US. However, the evidence is in contrast with Ozkan
(2002), who finds support for the agency cost theory for listed firms in the
UK.
Little support is found for the prediction from the pecking order theory
that profitability is inversely related to total debt, because the negative eﬀect
on long term debt dominates. The coeﬃcient of return on assets is positive
for short-term debt and negative for long-term debt and (highly) significant
in both cases. The combined eﬀect is a shortening of debt maturity, as the
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pecking order theory predicts, but the eﬀect on total leverage is positive,
rejecting the pecking order theory. The positive eﬀect on short-term debt
clearly dominates the negative eﬀect on long-term debt.
The hypothesis that firms match the maturity of their debt and assets is
supported by the empirical analysis. The coeﬃcients of the ratio of current-
to-total assets all have the hypothesized signs and are (highly) significant.
As the negative coeﬃcient for short-term debt is larger than the positive
coeﬃcient for long-term debt, an increase in asset maturity is mainly financed
with short-term debt. This evidence is in line with the previous empirical
studies, all of which support the maturity matching principle (see Table 1).
The size eﬀect is supported for debt maturity analysis. Short-term debt
decreases and long-term debt increases with size, and both significantly so.
Debt maturity increases with size for these firms. This is in line with Titman
and Wessels (1988), where short-term debt is found to be negatively related
to firm size, but not in line with the rejection of a size eﬀect for unlisted
firms in Scherr and Hulburt (2001). This conflicts with the support for a
size eﬀect for listed firms in Kim, Mauer and Stohs (1995) and Jun and Jen
(2003). The eﬀect on total leverage is negative: the use of debt diminishes
with size.
The coeﬃcients in both analyses do not diﬀer in sign and (with only
one exception) significance and their numerical values are comparable This
underlines the robustness of the results across the two diﬀerent samples.
The coeﬃcients of the industry dummies are all of the same order of
magnitude, see Table 6 in the appendix. So no industry specific eﬀects on
the determination of the maturity structure of debt are found in the data.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to supplement the existing literature with an
analysis of the factors determining the financial structure of non-listed firms.
The database used covers all limited liability firms in Norway. The analyses
give rise to the following conclusions.
First, taxes and the maturity matching principle appear to be the most
important determinants of the financing decision for non-listed firms in Nor-
way. In two random samples, leverage and debt maturity are seen to increase
with the size of non-debt tax shields and with the maturity of the firms’ as-
sets. The latter, i.e. support for the maturity matching principle, is in line
with practically all empirical studies of debt maturity. The former, i.e. sup-
port for a tax eﬀect, is much less common in the existing literature. Perhaps
using data for the non-listed firms contributes to this result.
Second, size and information asymmetry are found to be additional de-
terminants of the financial structure for non-listed firms. For these firms,
debt maturity increases with size and decreases with cross investments in
daughter companies that make firms less transparent. The results are robust
as the same conclusions are reached for a second random sample of unlisted
firms.
Third, the hypotheses that were formulated on the basis of the pecking
order theory and agency theory are rejected for the non-listed firms. Prof-
itability appears to be positively, rather than negatively, related to debt.
Similarly, sales growth is not found to be associated with a shorter debt
maturity, as agency theory predicts, but with a longer maturity.
On a more general level, the clear support for the tax eﬀect sets this study
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apart from most of the literature. The support for the maturity matching
principle is a common element with the empirical literature. Support for the
other hypotheses is mixed and, as such, not essentially diﬀerent from that in
most of the literature.
Finally, and in line with the arguments of Mikkelson (1984), we can con-
clude that the analysis of corporate capital structure can be strengthened by
incorporating more characteristics of firms’ claims structures, such as debt
maturity structure. A similar conclusion is presented in Bevan and Danbolt
(2002) who state that an analysis of capital structure is incomplete without a
detailed examination of all forms of corporate debt. Determinants may have
diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent debt categories and if this occurs, the eﬀects will
be diminished or obscured if the analysis is restricted to total debt. This
is clearly the case in this paper: more often than not, the empirical proxy
variables have opposite eﬀects on the two debt categories distinguished here.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Overview of empirical studies on capital structure and debt
maturity
Tax AS AG PO FCF MM Size
Mitchell (1993) R (S) S
Barclay and Smith (1995) R S S S
Griner and Gordon (1995) S R
Kim, Mauer and Stohs (1995) (S) (S) S S
Guedes and Opler (1996) R (S) S S R
Stohs and Mauer (1996) (S) S R S S
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1999) S
Ghosh and Cai (1999) S S
Newberry and Novack (1999) S S S
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) S
Chirinko and Singha (2000) R
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) (S) (S) R S R
Ozkan (2002) (S) R S S S
Jun and Jen (2003) S S S
Notes: S = support, correct sign and significant, (S) = weak support, correct
sign, but insignificant, R = rejected, no support. AS = asymmetric informa-
tion/signaling, AG = agency cost, PO = pecking order, FCF = free cash flow,
MM = maturity matching principle.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the two samples used
sample 1 mean std.dev min max
total assets 18311 114264 101 3935087
depreciation 0.083 0.199 -3.57 2.12
investm. daughter 0.0057 0.046 0 0.97
growth of sales 0.163 1.553 -1.00 136.66
return on assets 0.174 0.253 -3.66 5.22
CA/TA 0.609 0.306 -0.08 1.1
ln (BV TA) 7.91 1.54 2.3 15.19
sample 2 mean std.dev min max
total assets 25763 218358 101 9307000
depreciation 0.080 0.189 -1.17 2.80
investm. daughter 0.0061 0.047 -0.01 0.97
growth of sales 0.135 1.479 -0.99 101
return on assets 0.1553 0.235 -4.64 5.09
CA/TA 0.607 0.301 -0.03 1.24
ln (BV TA) 8.05 1.573 3.09 16.04
Notes: CA = current assets, BV = book value, TA = total assets.
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Table 3. Estimates from fixed-eﬀects regression analysis from 1st random
sample
TD Exp. STD Exp. LTD
sign sign
depreciation/costs -0.14* - -0.30* + 0.16*
(-7.68) (-17.71) (14.35)
investments in -0.09 + 0.10 - -0.19*
daughter companies (-1.36) ( 1.67) (-4.90)
growth of sales 3.33·10−3 + 0.90·10−3 - 2.43·10−3*
(1.66) (0.49) (2.05)
return on assets 0.42* +/- 0.52* +/- -0.10*
(31.58) (42.73) (-12.50)
current assets / TA -0.21* + 0.21* - -0.42*
(-17.28) (19.41) (-59.38)
ln (TA) -0.03* - -0.05* + 0.01*
(-16.96) (-24.68) (9.38)
R
2
0.79 0.70 0.60
no.obs. 14,357
Notes: STD = short-term debt, LTD = long-term debt, TA = total assets.R
2
= adjusted R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5 percent
level.
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Table 4. Estimates from fixed-eﬀects regression analysis from 2nd random
sample
TD Exp. STD Exp. LTD
sign sign
depreciation/costs -0.14* - -0.23* + 0.09*
(-7.88) (-13.83) (8.33)
investments in -0.005 + 0.25* - -0.26*
daughter companies (-0.07) ( 4.03) (-6.35)
growth of sales 4.90·10−3* + 2.48·10−3 - 2.41·10−3*
(2.51) (1.37) (2.05)
return on assets 0.43* +/- 0.52 +/- -0.09*
(34.80) (45.00) (-11.95)
current assets / TA -0.18* + 0.25* - -0.43*
(-14.83) (22.23) (-58.95)
ln (TA) -0.04* - - 0.05* + 0.01*
(-18.64) (-26.55) (10.19)
R
2
0.80 0.71 0.60
no.obs. 13,910 13,910 13,910
Notes: STD = short-term debt, LTD = long-term debt, TA = total assets. R
2
= adjusted R-squared. t-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 5 percent level.
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Table 5. Description of the sectors in the Dun and Bradstreet database
NACE code Sector
1 Mining industry
2 Miscellaneous industry
3 Production of electrical and optical products,
production of transportation vehicles and other
4 Power and water supply, building and
construction operations
5 Trading of goods, repairing of vehicles and working
with domestic appliances, hotels and restaurants
7 Management of properties, business services and
rental businesses, public administration
8 Education and healthcare
9 Miscellaneous services, paid housework, international
organs and organizations
Note: Sector code 6 not used, since it contains financial firms.
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Table 6. Estimates of the sector dummies
TD STD LTD TD STD LTD
1st 2nd
sector 1 1.05* 0.65* 0.40* 1.06* 0.67* 0.39*
sector 2 1.01* 0.64* 0.37* 1.05* 0.67* 0.37*
sector 3 1.07* 0.67* 0.40* 1.07* 0.67* 0.40*
sector 4 1.12* 0.74* 0.38* 1.11* 0.76* 0.36*
sector 5 0.99* 0.59* 0.40* 1.01* 0.60* 0.41*
sector 7 1.05* 0.70* 0.35* 1.09* 0.72* 0.37*
sector 8 0.95* 0.61* 0.34* 0.98* 0.63* 0.36*
sector 9 0.96* 0.60* 0.35* 0.96* 0.61* 0.35*
F-test 31.19* 51.82* 20.32* 29.04* 58.44* 16.13*
Notes: Sample with unlisted firms for the first and second random sample.
STD = short-term debt, LTD = long-term debt, TA = total assets. F-test for the
hypothesis that all the sector dummies are equal. t-statistics in parentheses. *
significant at 5 percent.
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